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ABSTRACT
Psyd1ological schobrship on per.o nali ry is uni d ng wit h polirical sci ence ro redefine existing theories. Th.is is
clearly the case with rcse:irch o n judicial behavio r :ind che US Sup reme Courr. Bur if rhis new approach. is ro
survi ve and thrive, ir musr employ mC:tSun.:s equal to chc ras k. We show that Sup rem e Cou rt Ind iv idual
Personality Esrima1cs, whicl1 seek ro estimate just.ices' personalities by examining their co ncu rring opinions, suAe r fro m a number of impormnt m ethodo logical deficits char c ritically limir rhcir usefu lness. W/ e
briefly discuss what kincl~ of im proved pcrso n,tli ty measures scl10lars should use ins read and ofter an improved set of estimates for o ne trair with an app lication that demo nsrrates o ur cau ti onary ralc.

Pick up any biography on a Supreme Court justice. You will find a substantial amount of
attention directed to his or her personality. Read news articles about high court nominees,
and yo u are sure to come across something about their personalities. Inves tigate the
justices' private archival papers, and instantly you will develop a sense for their different
styles and personalities. Retrospective analyses abom the Court's previous terms-as well
as prospective analyses about its future terms-seem always to address justices' p ersonalities. People wanr co know about the justices' personalities.
Scholarly interest in the empirical connection between personality and judging is g rowing steadily as well (e.g. , Braman and Nelson 2007; Bram an 2009; Collins 2011; Moyer
2012; Owens and Wedeking 20 I 2; Hall 20 I 8; Black et al. 2020). Whereas Epstein and
Knight's (I 9S8) pacesetting book on strategic judging did not mention the term "personality" once, Ep~tein, Landes, and Posner's (2013) reassess ment of judicial behavior included
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at least 16 references to iL Personality scholarship could wind up filling key voids in our

\'<'c ,uspl'ct few scholars of the Court would identify these two partic.ular measures as

current understanding of judicial behavior. But for personality research to rake hold, and

nlkri w. 1hc most direct or intuitive assessment of justice ideology, so we examine four ad-

for scholars to maximize its potential, we require accurate measures of justices' personalities.

d it ion.ii approad1cs co measuring judicial preferences. First, we look at the simple propor-

Two recent books empirically examine rhe effecrs of justices' traits on judicial behavior:
Hall (2018) and Black et al. (2020). As chis anide dialogue hopefully demonstrates, we

1i,

,11 , ,1

, , 11m-rva1ive votes

case by ead1 justice over the course of his or her career. \V~ count

1hc 11u111bcr of conservative votes and divide tl1at into the total number ofvotes cast by the

believe both have the potential to push the scholarly agenda. Hall investigates how all

ju~1ic~· 1hat had a determinable ideological direction. This is the approach used in basically

Big Five traits influence five judicial actions: agenda setting, opinion assignment, intra-

n

Court bargaining, voting, and writing separate opinions. Our work focuses on a single

Sl'gal-l :over scores co Martin-Quinn scores (Marcin and Quinn

trait, conscientiousness, and examines how it influences nine judicial actions: agenda set-

tion of l :Bl scores themselves.
Second, we examine each justice's Segal-Cover score, which is derived from a content

ting, legal persuasion in oral argument and legal writing, the decision co side wich the solicitor general, majority opinion assignments, opinion bargaining, the content of the Court's

l'IY

n, ,ting study that introduces a new approach to measuring preferences, ranging from

2002) co even the valida-

analy~i~ of the preconfirmacion hearing newspaper editorials written about each nominee

opinions, the treatment of precedent, whether justices follow public opinion, and when

(see also Segal et al. 1995). These scores have the added bonus of being the only measure

justices recuse. Taken together, these works show chat personality influences nearly all aspects of judicial behavior.

of ideology not derived from any aspect of how a justice behaves once on the Court

We have two goals with this paper. First, we aim to raise concerns about the personality

ness, however, since a good number of justices seem co show evidence of ideological change

measures originally employed by Hall (2018) and subsequently published in Hall et al.

(2021): the Supreme Court Individual Personality Estimates (SCIPEs). To do so, we de-

over the cou1-s~ of their careers (e.g., Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal 2007).
Our final two additions are more sophisticated approaches that summarize judicial

ploy a more inclusive sec of ideology measures to demonstrate there is ultimately limited
evidence of SCIPE's empirical validity. We then seek co uncover the source of this validity

votes through the u~-e of item response theory models. In particular, we estimate a twoparameter item response model co produce a single, career-level estimate of each justice's

deficit by examining SCIPE's reliance on a single source of text: concurring opinions writ-

ideal point. That is, as our third measure, we estimate a justice's static Martin-Quinn score

ten by the justices. Beyond the inherent circularity of this approach, our results find chat

(Martin and Quinn 2002). 2 Our final measure is a career-averaged ideology score as es-

concurring opinions may not actually reflect justices' personalities.

timated by the approach suggested by Bailey (2007, 2013). The key difference between

Second, we then seek to provide constructive insights into what kinds of estimates

(cf. voting on cases or hiring law clerks). That strength is arguably also their greatest weak-

these latter two approaches is that the Martin and Quinn-inspired version uses only the

could be appropriate to examine justices' personalities. After explaining what those esti-

actual votes cast by justices on cases, whereas Bailey's formulation creatively leverages in-

mates might look like, we apply the conscientiousness trait-the personality concept on

stances where a justice cakes a position on a case in which she was not a voting member

which we have focused extensively (Black et al. 2020)-ro the relationship between lower

of the Court (e.g., Juscice Thomas writing chat he believes the Court ruled wrongly in a

court conflict and justices' agenda-setting votes. The results reveal the significant substantive limitations and inferential risks of using SCIPEs to study personality on the Supreme

previously decided case, decades before he joined the Court).
All four of our additional measures as well as the CBI score are near continuous in na-

Court and the need for more careful measures for this growing scholarly market.

ture, so we use ordinary least squares regression to examine the relationship between alter-

REASSESSING SCIPE VALIDITY

in each case are dichotomous ( l ifliberal, O if conservative), we use logistic regression for

To validate their five trait estimates, Hall et al. (2021) subject those estimates co two ex-

chose data. 3

native ideology measures and SCIPE scores. And, because the individual votes justices case

aminations related to the concept of ideology. First, they analyze the correlation between
their trait scores and the ideological direction of each justice's vote in each case (Spaeth
et al. 2010). 1 Second, they analyze the correlation between their trait scores and a justice's
Clerk-Based Ideology (CBI) score, which come from the political campaign contributions
made by their former law clerks (Bonica et al. 2017).

I. See Hall et al. (2021, n. 8), where they state that their binomial logit model (with 34 obscrvarions) is "tantamount co estimating a logic model where the 11nit ofanalysis is the individual vote," which
would h~ve well over 60,000 observations (emphasis added).

2. Hall et al. (2<)21, n. 7) reject using this approach. They assen that summarizing the MartinQuinn scores co a single value per justice would result in "a great degree ofimprecision." This remark is
paradoxical, because the CBI scores on which they rdy follow precisely such an approach. Each year, a
justice hires multiple law clerks, some of whom will have Campaign Finance scores, as identified by
Bonica et al. (2017). Jt1Stices serve for multiple year,. As calculated by Bonica et al. (2017), a justice's CBI
score is determined by averaging all of those clerks who have Campaign Finance scores. Thus, it pools together all clerks, and all of those terms of data are being reduced to a single value. We rail to see what actual
unique hazard a career-averaged Martin-Quinn score poses that a career-averaged CBI score does not.
3. The data come from both the "modern" and "legacy" versions of the Supreme Court Database,
which give us a total of over 72,000 votes from the Coun's 1937 to 2019 terms. As no SCIPE estimates
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In addition to the individual trait estimates, Hall et al. (2021) also include controls for a
justice's sex and binh year. We estimate our modds both with and without these controls,
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both to assess sensitivity to their exclusion and provide practical guidance to would-be
users of SQPEs. Analyzing the data using both approaches is important since, although
Hall ec al. include these controls in their validation models (and three of the four are statistically significant), neither they nor Hall (2018) includes chem in any of the substantive
applications/ chapters.
Figures I and 2 show our resulcs. In figure I , each of the individual panels corresponds
to one of the Big Five traits. The Y-axis within each panel identifies which measure ofideology we examine. Each X-axis reporu the coefficients from our 01.S regressions. In order
co facilitate apples-t<rapples comparisons among the different dependent variables, we
standardized all of them prior to estimating each modd. SCIPEs are already standardized,
so a coefficient of 0.75 means that a one standard deviation increase in a given trait trans-

-04

·O.J

00

OJ

Ot

01

01

'4.2

-04

- ·- -·
__

00

02

O•

01

•U

-OS

00

.

c..= "'.=~,,..-- ...-_-_-_-_-.,.-r...-_::_-.;--,
.,___,_

_,...

lates into a 0.75 standard deviation increase in the ideology measure. Finally, within the
plotting space, we identify estimates for models that do (circles) and do not (squares) include controls for justice sex or binh year. The horizontal whiskers denote the confidence
intervals around the coefficient estimates. The thicker lines show the 80% values, the
vertical ticks show the 90% values, and the thinner llne extends to the 95% values (all twotailed tests).
Consider the conscientiousness trait. Scholarship shows that it consistently correlates
with ideological conservatism both among the mass public and among political elites like
·State legislators (Dietrich et al. 2012) and members of Congress (Ramey, Klinger, and
Hollibaugh 2017).4 We therefore should expect to see a positive and statistically significant correlation between SCIPE-assessed conscientiousness and conservative ideology.
The SCIPE-assessed conscientiousness measure provides no such correlation, however.
In figure I, we examine three measures that directly tap into ideology, as evidenced in the
votes cast by a justice. Only one-the Bailey score-provides even weak evidence of an
association. What is more, that weak association only appears when simultaneously controlling for a justice's sex and age. In other words, the measures by themselves are insufficient. Consistent with Hall et al. (2021 ), we find decently strong evidence ofan association
with the CBI measure, but this coo requi res the inclusion of the demographic control
variables.
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Figure 1. Summary of ideology models with SCI PE trait estimates. The horizontal
whiskers report 95% (thin lines), 90% (vertical ticks), and 80% {thick lines) confidence intervals (all two-tailed). See text for additional description.

Next, consider agreeableness. Scholarship on the correlation between ideology and agreeableness is mixed, but Dietrich et al (20 12, 203), who conducted a comprehensive review
of roughly two dozen studies, note chat "several studies have found [a] modest link ...
between agreeableness and liberal identification." These authors found chat more agreeable state legislators were more liberal. Ramey ec al.'s (2017) study of Congress found similar results. As figure I indicates, however, no such relationship exists between SCIPEs and
any of the five measures of judicial ideology. None of the coefficients is signed in the correct direction, and, in any event, all have very wide confidence intervals.
Dietrich et al. (2012) classify neuroricism as having a "modest" negative relationship
with ideological con.~rvatism (or, if you prefer, a positive correlation with liberalism).
Across five dependenr variables and two different model specifications, however, we find

yet exist for Justi~. Gonuch and Kavanaugh, we exclude die 184 and I 09 vores case by diem, respectively. Gonuch has written 14 concurrences co dace and Kavanaugh has written 10. le is unclear ac what
point justices will have written enough opinions co be able co estimate dieir personaliry.
4. Given die ccniraliry of die conscientiousness trait in our earlier work, we also examined five additional criterion validity dependent variables for SOPEs. Ouc of die five, SOPEs were significandy correlated with only one at die p < .20 lcvd (Black et al. 2020, 56). Note that die Hall (2018) SCIPE
measures are identical co diosc reported in Hall et al. (2021), so that existing result is applicable to die
scores as republished in Hall et al. (202 I). (Our measures were significant at die p < . IO level or better
for four of die five variables.)

only a single result that is statistically significant and in the expected direction. As reported
by Hall et al. (2021), the CBI score paired with demographic controls yidds a statisticaliy
significant coefficient. As our plot shows, however, this effect is weakened both in magnitude and significance level if one omits the demographic control variables. And, of course,
none of the four other measures of ideology exhibits any connection with neuroticism.
Next, the trait of openness has, by Dietrich et al.'s (2012, 203) accounting. "consistently ... been found to be a strong predictor of ideological liberalism." As such, we should
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expect to find a negative relationship between openness and conservatism, since all five
of our measures arc scaled with positive values being conservative. This is not what we
see in figure I, however. Indeed, not a single one of chc IO models produced a result thac
even approaches statistical significance.

·· <• .. . . .. . . . . . . ....

•

C onsc,cnliousness

Agreeableness

I

• No

I

of any of the traits. On one hand, Dietrich cc al.'s (2012, 203) comprehensive canvassing
included as a predictor of ideology." On the other hand, ic is unclear where Hall et

Conlrola?

I

Next, we consider exuaversion. Predictions here are probably the mosc challenging
of the literature lead them co conclude that chis trait "routinely produces null results when

....

I

. . •· · ····

Neuroticism

·•·

al.

(2021) put their chips, as they first note rhac one mass public study found a negative reOpenness

lationship between liberalism and excraversion. They chen go on co observe chat the analysis of members of Congress by Ramey ec al. (2017) found a positive association.
Starting with the five aggregate measures, we find some moderately consistent evidence
that excraversion is positively associated with liberalism, with results in the range of statis-

Extraveraion

'

tical significance for a justice's Manin-Quinn score, Bailey score, and CBI score. As with

-0.2

··•·
I

-0.1

I .

'

0.0

I

0.1

·•·
I

0.2

the earlier significant results, however, all of these results are sensitive to the inclusion/exCoefficient Estimate

clusion of the demographic control variables. And, given that the Hall et al. measures are
derived from the same software as the Ramey et al. study, it is possible this is an artifact of
the particular method as opposed to something substantively informative.
We next turn our attention to figure 2, which follows the same approach to predict the
ideological direction of justices' votes. It shows coefficient estimates for the SCI PE variables from two logistic regression models. Circles represent models that include controls,

Figure 2. Summary of justice vote models with SCIPE trait estimates. The dependent
variable is coded 1 if a justice voted liberally and O if he or she voted conservatively in a
case. For both models, N = 72.657. Gray points are statistically insignificant (p > .20), and
black points are significant at the .05 level. Significance calculated using naive standard
errors (see n. 5 for additional discussion).

and squares denote models that exclude them. We use point color co mark whether a var-

but one that excludes them does. In fact, the coefficient size increases by a factor of 10,

iable is (black) or is noc (gray) scatistically significant 5 All of the black points are significant

changes signs, and becomes statistically significant in the expected direction when exclud-

at the .05 level and the two gray points have two-tailed p-values greater than .20.

ing the demographic controls.

For conscientiousness, the vote-level results in figure 2 underscore the SCIPE's sensi-

For neuroticism, in the context of the vote-level models, we again confront a confusing

tivity co demographic controls. We observe a strong and statistically significant effect in

pair of results. The inclusion of demographic controls determines whether the effect of the

the expected direction only when the models include demographic controls. That is, in-

SCIPE neuroticism estimate is positive and statistically significant (controls included) or

crc·a., ,·<i conscientiousness decreases the probability of a liberal vote only when the models

negative and statistically significant (controls excluded).

include demographic controls. If the models exclude demographic controls--and contain

For openness, the results are more encouraging if one considers the individual vote

onlv rhe SCIPEs--thc coefficient size shrinks nearly to zero and the standard errors cor-

models, where the effect is positive and largely unchanged regardless of how one handles

respondingly increase, rendering them statistically indistinguishable from zero.

the demographic controls or the calculation of standard errors. Yee, as Hall et al. {2021)

For agreeableness, the vote-level models in figure 2

also show sensitivity to the inclu-

~iun ol J emographic controls, though here the effect is actually reversed as compared to
conscic:nciousness. A model that includes controls fails to show any significant correlation,

themselves note, this is due in no small pan to the fact that these models contain mo.r e than
70,000 observations.

;,

As co the vote-level analyses on extravcrsion, we again observe that the sign of the effect
depends critically on whether one includes the demographic controls. When they are in-

5. Givc-n the panel nature of the voce data. an additional consideration is the sensitivity of the resuJ15
rousing dilTcrenc approaches co calculating standard errors. Hall et al. (2021) report, in the parlance of
Zorn (200<>1, the equivalent of"naive" standard errors, which is co say char they assume conditional independence The inferences regarding significance arc unchanged if one utilizes so-called robust scandard errors. or scandard errors clusccrcd on the approximacely 9,000 cases in the data. If, however, one
uses s1anda,d errors clusccrcd on justice, then mosc of the SCIPE coefficiencs fall out of significance, owing co the much smaller number of observations (only 34).

cluded, extraversion is positively correlated with casting a liberal vote; when the controls
arc cx~luded, however, the effect switches signs, decreases in absolute magnirude, and yet
still re~uns its statistical significance.
Tak~n together, these findings show thac the SCIPEs do not appear co provide valid
estimates.ofSupreme Court justices' personality traits. This is consistent with our previous
work, which also shows that the SCIPE trait estimates fail to perform in the way one would
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expect across a half dozen nonideological outcome variables. 6 We rum next
some data-driven insights into why this might be the case.

to

offering

THE DANGER OF USING CONCURRING OPINIONS TO ESTIMATE
JUSTICES' PERSONALITIES

As a preliminary matter, it is wonh emphasizing that we fully agree with the general ap-

proach utilized by Hall et al. (2021). That is, a text-based approach is likely to be the optimal (though by no means the only) way of assessing judicial personalities from afur. 7 As
Pennebaker et al. (2015, l) tell us: "The ways people use words in their daily lives can provide rich information about their beliefs, fears, thinking patterns, social relationships, and
personalities" (emphasis added). Herein lies the challenge. Scholars are generally not privy
to the conversations, text messages, and emails political elites like Supreme Coun justices
generate in their daily lives, and so we need to look elsewhere for that information. Where
we part ways from the approach of Hall (2018) and Hall et al. (2021) is in where one
ought to go looking to find such information.

Concurrences Primarily Reflect the Court's Majority Opinion
As the sole source of input for their trait estimates, Hall et al. examine the concurring opinions justices have written while serving as a Supreme Coun justice. We are skeptical (Black
et al. 2020). Perhaps the biggest problem is that Hall et al. (2021) simply ask too much of
a single type of document to be able to provide valid insighrs into personality. An approach
that puts all of its eggs in a single basket is likely to be insufficient.
To appreciate the magnitude of the gap between the ideal and Hall et al.'s approach, it
is useful to consider the primary sources that the researchers who develop text-to-trait
models employ to identify the textual correlates of personality traits. That is, when scholars
arc rrying to discern what fundamental patterns exist, from where do their "daily words"
come?
Tvpically, scholars will employ texts of a more "natural" cast to estimate personality.
Personality Recognizer-the approach utilized by Hall et al. (2021 )-repurposed a corpus
of essays written by undergraduate psychology students who responded to a prompt that
6. In particular, we examined how each of the five SCIPE trait estimates perfurmed across six additional outcomes variables, for a total of 30 comparisons. Even with an inclusive definition of consist, 11,, ,
find char only 10 of the 30 comparisons are consistent with the literature. The trait-by-trait
breakdown is conscientiousness, 1/6; agreeableness, 3/6; neuroticism, 3/6; openness, 1/6; and extraversion, 2/(,. The appendix (available online) contains additional derails and discussion of these results (see
:ii, .. 1\1.,. I ,·r al. 2020, 69-77).
7. A text-based measure is not the only alternative for present-clay researchers. One could anempr
to gcr experts to evaluate or rare justices on each personality dimension, as has been anempred numerou, rime, , n rhe psychological literature. However, afier doing a thorough meta-analysis of chis body of
work, Conndly and Ones (2010) found that correlations between self and "other's" personality rating-;
only added value if the raters were high on interpersonal intimacy (e.g., fumily members). Thus, this option i, high Iv unlikely co yield bener results for Supreme Court justices, almost all of whose fumilies are
either very private or would be temporally limited to only recent justices.

379

solicir,·d rh,11 "rlwughrs, feelings and sensations are at this moment.... Your goal in this
assigrnn,111 1, ro reveal in your writing the way your mind works naturally" (Pennebaker
and Kint: I 'l'l9, 1_',O I). Concurring opinions, by contrast, seem to us anything bur an
opcr1-t·11.'bt , ,pporr unity ro express one's self. As Corley (20 l 0, 96) notes, concurring opinions oltcn 011nm1111ic.1tc a justice's "understanding ofthe majority opinion" (emphasis added).
Simibrh-. R11 ( l 'J'lO, 783) observes that "by writing separately, a concurring author alwavs otlc-1, .111 intcrn;il commentary on the coun's judgment." In other V1,"Urds, concurring
opinion., do 1wr provide an open-ended opportunity fur expression. Majority opinions often suh1.1111i.dlv fr.1mc and constrain the content of concurring opinions in a given case, 8
In ddcnding concurrences, Hall (2018, 38) quotes approvingly from a longtime circuit court judge: "[SCIPE's] focus on concurrences reflects Judge Frank Coffin's description of the 'feding of unjudicial glee as one shucks off the normal restraint of writing for a
panel and proceeds to thrust and parry with gay abandon."' The same colorful quote also
appears in Hall et al. (2021 ). However, when read with the added context of the paragraph
from which the quote originates, one cannot help but doubt whether Coffin was actually
talking about concurrences, as Hall and Hall et al. suggest. Here is that quotation along
with its source paragraph, which is absent from both Hall and Hall et al.'s presentation ·
of it:

A concurrence is like a fencing foil; it elegantly makes its usually bloodless points. A
dissent, on the other hand, is more like a broadsword. It takes more resolution and
commitment to wield it and there is the expectation of drawing at least a little
blood. In any event, there is a feeling of unjudicial glee as one shucks off the normal
restraint of writing for a panel and proceeds to thrust and parry with gay abandon.
For this very reason, we judges are well advised to resist the temptation unless we
find a compelling interest and no more effective alternative. Sometimes, however, a
dissent is the precise instrument that should be used. [Note: Coffin then goes on to
enumerate the five conditions in which he believes a dissent is appropriate.] (Coffin
1994, 227)
Perhaps most dispositive, however, is the fuct that the entire paragraph itself-"thruSr and
parry" quote included-appears in a section that is labeled with the heading "Dissenting
Opinions" and not in the distinctive "Concurring Opinions" section on the previous page.
Interestingly, what thoughts Coffin does offer about concurring opinions are all consiS tent
with our majority-response view of concurring opinio~s; that is, they center on how the
concurring opinion will expand or limit the majority opinion (Coffin 1994, 226-27).
Even ifwe accept the Coffin quote as deployed by Hall and Hall et al., it still identifies
what we believe co be a critical and inherent limitation uflooking only at concurrences (or
8. The approach that built the models we used in our work on personality-leveraged Twitter
.
feeds-perhaps rhe ultimate open-ended response format-from over 1,500 individuals, though obviously with a character limit for each individual tweer (Black et al. 2020, 35).
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curring opinions should appear, on average, like the majority opinions. Moreover, it
should also appear more like the majority opinion than other concurring opinions written
by that same justice. In our earlier work, we tested this argument by analyzing opinionlevel personality content in the Court's majority opinion and any of the concurring opinions that accompanied ic. We then also examined the personality content in pairs of concurring opinions written by the same author. What we found when we compared the cwo

',I0,0,11) •·Of\C.Uf

ooe(.1:1·::l

instant "thoughts, feelings, and sensations," but rather is fundamentally constrained by the
content, topics, and, to a large degree, the specific words utilized by the majority opinion
(i.e., the would-be opponent in Coffin's fencing match).
At any rate, this question is testable. If we are correa, the personality content of con-

-

-

or
C>

dissents for that matter): a justice or judge is not writing in a manner that elicits that jurist's
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was that the correlation in personality content of majority-concur pairings was at least

Consc1ont10.uan~ss

three rimes larger than the analogous correlation between pairings of concurring opinions
written by the same author (Black et al. 2020). Or, stared a bit differently, opinions written by rwo different justices in the same case had more alike in terms of their apparent
personality than opinions written by the same justice across cwo different cases.
Here we build upon this previous analysis in cwo important ways. First, when seleaing
a different concurring opinion, we originally only constrained the pool of possibilities to be
other concurrences written by the same justice. This meant rhar we could be pairing an
economic activity concurrence with one, say, about the First Amendment. Given that
the majority and concurring opinion comparison come from the exact same case, there
is a guaranteed agreement in terms of issue area. This, in turn, could be inflating the cor-

AQreeabfeno.ss

Neuroliclam

Openneu

Extnwer11ion

Figure 3. Comparison of opinion-level personality content. The dashed lines report ·
the correlation between the content of a majority opinion and a concurring opinion in
the same case. The violin plots show the correlation between the concurring opinion a nd
another, randomly chosen concurring opinion written by the same justice in the same '.s•
sue area. We repeated this random assignment process a total of 10,000 times. The ctr·
cles. black rectangles, and vertical whiskers correspond to the median, Interquartile
range, and minimum/maximum. respectively. Text annotations above the dashed line
report how much bigger the majority-concur correlations are compared to the concurconcur correlations.

relations we found between a case's majority and concurring opinions. To address this is-

vertical whisker spans the full range of the l 0,000 iterations. The black rectangle idencifies

sue, we now limit the pool of possible concurrences to be those in the same issue area

the 25th and 75th percentiles. The white circle shows the median. The text annotations

(while still requiring that it was the same justice authoring it).

above the dashed line show the fucror by which the majority-concur correlations exceeds
the concur-concur correlations, using the median and, in brackets, the minimum and max-

Second, the results we report in our book come from a single set of random pairings.
Th:n is, we took each of the more than 2,700 concurring opinions in our data and ran-

imum vaJues for the l 0,000 samples.
Median vaJues for the concur-concur correlations range from a low of .14 for agree-

domly paired them with one other concurrence by the same author and computed the
resulting correlations for each of the Big Five traits. Justices in our data, however, often

ableness to a high of.19 for neuroricism, which, co be fair, are elevated relative to the values

authored quite a few concurring opinions (the median is 65). One plausible concern is
char by hanging our hat on a single set of results, perhaps we just pulled a particularly "un-

we found in our initial analysis (they ranged from .08 to .13). That being said, our ultimate
conclusion remains the same. the same case pairings continue ro overwhelmingly domi-

lud,; .. draw of concurrences with which to make those calculations. To address rhis con-

nate the same justice pairings across rhe board. Four out of five trairs observe correlations

cern. we then repeated this entire process a total of l 0,000 times. That is, we paired each of
rhe 2. 700 (or so) concurrences with a random one written by the same justice and within

char are ar least twice assrrongas compared to the median result from our 10,000 samples.
Importantly, in not one of the l 0,000 samples we anaJyzed did the concur-concur corre-

the same issue area and calculated the trait correlations. W c then did it a second time, and

lations march, let alone surpass the majority-concur correlation in strength. Thus, by even
this rather conservative test, we find the fundamental theory chat underlies SCIPEs ro be

then a third, and so on.
Figwe 3 displays the results from this analysis. Each of the five panels represents one
personality trait. Within each panel, we show the level of correlation between the majority
and concurring opinions in a case with the dashed line. The violin plots in each panel
pomay the distribution of correlations we recovered from the 10,000 sampling iterations
char we performed. The gray area shows the distribution like a kernel density plot. The

wanting.9

9. The same-case majoricy-c6ncur correlation provides a substantively motivated basdine againsr
which we can compare our results. lmponandy, our bar is actually (much) lower than what on~ w~ul~
expect in previous srudies on the retesting of personality traits. Individuals in a Supreme Coun iusnce 5
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The Impact of a Concurrence's Legal Purpose
The above suggests a general lack ofconsistency within the corpus ofa justice's concurring
opinions--even those that were written on the same general topic. Again, this is not especially surprising given what published research on the topic more than a decade ago has
already demonstrated: when justices write concurring opinions, they do so for a wide range
of substantive legal purposes (Corley 2010). Although this point isn't addressed in Hall
(2018), Hall et al. (2021) do acknowledge this-as well as other features-as sources of
"potential" bias but then, without providing any assessment of the impact of such a bias,
assert that their approach is still valid.
In our earlier work, we already examined the impact of these biases by drawing out a
number of comparisons among different types of concurring opinions. Our results suggested that they are not just hypothetical but are both substantial and systematic. Justices
vaty, for example, in the rate at which they write a regular versus a special concurrence.
Not only that, but the trait estimates one would arrive at vary significantly if you examine
one type of concurrence versus another (Black et al. 2020). Relatedly, one of the main assertions made by Hall et al. (2021) in defense of concurrences is that their authors lack
an incentive to accommodate the requests of other colleagues. Here, too, our previously
published work demonstrated that justices vary quite a bit in terms of whether their concurrences are joined by other colleagues; Justice Douglas, for example, wrote for only himself in more than 90% of his nearly 130 concurrences. At the other end of spectrum, Justice Brennan concurred nearly 170 times in his career and the majority of those were
joined by one or more of his brethren. And, once again, we find considerable discrepancies
in the resulting trait estimates one would produce by using one set of concurrences versus
another (Black et al. 2020).

opinion. rcspc:ctivcly. Reluctant concurrences indicate chat a justice may join the majoric~- 11 11 i111"n, b111 with reservations. Finally, unnecessary concurrences exist when a justice
concurs ~pccially but does not write an opinion clarifying why she disagrees with the

So, it turns out we already know quite a bit about systematic bias in the singular documents that create SCIPEs. Here we build on these existing effons by probing, in more
detail, the importance of the legal purpose of concurring opinions. To do so, we turn co
Corley (201 0), who identified a total of six different categories of concurrences: doctrinal,
rn 1phatic, expansive, limiting, reluctant, and unnecessary. 10 Doctrinal concurrences are
whar judicial scholars often refer to as "special concurrences." Here, the justice joins the
m;1jority's result but not the rationale it uses to reach that result. And so the justice writes
a concurring opinion to explain how her rationale differs from the majority's. Emphatic
concurrences seek to clarify a particular aspect of the majority opinion. Expansive concun ,nces and limiting concurrences seek to enlarge or restrict the scope of the majority

variation in the resulting length of each of these files. Justice Scalia's corpus of doctrinal
concurrences weighs in at more than 45,000 words in length. Scalia's body of restrictive
concurrences, by contrast, contains just over 400 words. We follow Hall et al. (2021, n. 3)
and exclude four justice-concurring combinations that contain fewer than 500 words. 13 In
addition to these justice-type pairings, we also generated a single file for each justice that
contains all of her concurrences. This is equivalent to the approach utilized by Hall ec al.,

.1gc cHcgory (i.e., middle co late adulthood) typically generate test-retest correlations that range between

0. 50 and 0.80 (Costa and McCrae 1994, cited in Fraley and Roberts 2005, 60). Even this lower threshold is "ill more than double the magnitude of even the single highest correlation we found in our
I f),000 ,amples. Fraley and Roberts (2005, 61) find evidence of a temporal effect for test-retesting re•
sulLs wl,creby longer time intervals reduce the correlation, but even a gap of 30 years still yields a correlation ol more than 0.50.
I 0.

Our description of these cypes borrows heavily from Corley (2010, I 5-19).

maioril\·\ rationale.
( ·, ,rln perli,rms a painstaking content analysis of nearly 300 concurrences written during chc: Court's l 98Cr89 terms, coding each concurring opinion as belonging to one of
the ,ix prn iously described categories. 11 Her work further documents considerable variation
in each ju~cicc's tendency to write or join different types of concurring opinions (Corley
2010, 32). In terms of doctrinal concurrences, fur example, just over 45% ofJustice Brennan's concurring activity took place in such opinions as compared to only 16% for Justice Kennedy; when it came co expansive concurrences, however, Kennedy showed.a
stronger preference for those (22% of his activity) as compared to Brennan (only 10% of
his activity).
We next seek co ascertain whether chis varying mixture of concurrences translates into
the same sort of differences we previously uncovered with respect to overall personality
trait estimation. Again, the intuition is fairly straightforward: if these different opinions
are producing equivalent information about the writer's personality, then there should be
a reasonable degree of consistency among the estimates we obtain. To that end, we utilize
Carley's coding of the concurring opinions co assess how sensitive estimates of justice personalities are depending on the type of concurring opinion used to generate those inputs.
To do so, we started by gathering the 269 written concurrences coded by Corley. Unnecessary concurrences, by definition, do not include a written opinion, and so we necessarily had co exclude chose. We then aggregated all of a justice's opinions by each concurring opinion type, which yielded a rota! of 43 merged opinions. 12 There is considerable

and so we include it for comparison purposes.
Opinion files in hand, we then simply process this corpus offiles using Personality Recognizer as utilized by Hall et al. Because we have six different types ofinputs (one for each

11. ·,Corley chose these terms because they align with a subsequent qualitative analysis she undertook using the papers of Justices B}ackmun and Marshall.
12. This value is lower than the product of the number of justices and concurring opinion types
(i.e., 10 x 5 = 50) because some justices never wrote a particular type of concurrence. For example,
neither Justice Powell nor Justice O'Connor ever wrote a reluctant concurrence.
13. The four justice/type pairings are Kennedy-Restrictive, Scalia-Restrictive, Powell-Expansive, and
Rehnquist-Restrictive. We do retain one pairing that just barely misses the 500-word mark: ScaliaEmphatic, which has 497 words.
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and a scorL' of 1.3, by contrast puts him 1.3 standard deviations above the mean for the trait.
The absolute difference between these two extremes is 3.1 units, which is quite large.
Ewn a casual eyeballing of these results shows that most justices ~ to bounce around
in relation to their colleagues. Moreover, chis movement based on input does not follow a
consistent or predictable pattern. For example, in terms of his conscientiousness, Blackmun's emphatic concurrences (the triangle) evince considerably more conscientiousness
than do his reluctant concurrences (the diamond). The opposite is true, however, for Justice
Brennan (WJB), whose reluctant concurrences show higher conscientiousness than his emphatic ones. And, as the annotations by their initials reveal, Brennan, much like Blackmun,
also observes a lot of variation in his concurrence-assessed conscientiousness (2.4 units between the minimum and maximum).
To provide more of a macro-level assessment, however, we turn to figure 5, which visualizes absolute-value differences, like those of Blackmun's and Brennan's we just
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Agreeableness

Openness

Figure 4. Personality traits as estimated by different concurring opinion types

14. <>ne might notice that some symbols appear to be "missing" from the plots; this is due to a justice not having written a sufficient number of concurrences in that type for Personality Recogniu:r to
be able to ~merate a valid estimate.
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wnuurence type plus one containing all concurrences), we have a total ofsix different sets
· of estimates for each of the Big Five traits for the IO justices in the Corley data. Figure 4
plots all of these estimates. Each of the five panels corresponds to an individual trait. The
X-axis shows the standardired trait score. Within the plot, we use different symbols to
identifv what specific inputs were used to generate that estimate} 4 The Y..axis identifies
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Range of Difference in Trait Scores by Concurrence Type
Figure 5. Box plots of the absolute value differences in each justice's concurrence-type
trait estimate. Each plot portrays 10 data points, which are identified in the parentheticals
of figure 4.
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described. In that sense, it provides us with an opporcunity co examine whether che "potential for such bias" chat Hall er al. (2021) acknowledge is simply potential as opposed
co realized. Each of the Big Five traits appears along the Y-axis. The values portrayed in
each of the box plots come from the parencheticals in figure 4. Thar is, for the conscientiousness box plot, we include the 3.1 value for Blackmun and the 2.4 value for Brennan
plus the other eight justices in the data.
Within each box plot, the thicker black line denotes the median value and the shaded
gray area identifies the interquarcile range of these values. Of particular note, the median
amount of difference between a justice's smallest and largest estimates for a trait is never
less than 1.4 standard deviations. Another consistent feature of these results is chat there
are large gaps for all IO of the justices in the data. To wit, all justices have at least one trait
where their minimum/maximum gap is ac least one standard deviation in magnitude.
Eight of the 10 justices have one or more gaps chat are at least two standard deviations,
and fully four of chose eight also have one or more gaps chat are three or more standard
deviations. This indicates a high degree of trait sensitivity driven soldy by the documents
included in the estimation process, which itself suggests chat these different documents
are, consistent with the liceracure on concurrences, in face vety distinctive.

WHAT KIND OF PERSONALITY MEASURES WOULD
BE APPROPRIATE OR IDEAL?

We have raised serious questions about the personality measures from Hall (2018) and
Hall et al. (2021). But the next question is, what kind of text-based measures would be
appropriate co employ? As a baseline, it would be ideal co generate personality measures
for all of the justices under consideration. We recognize, however, there may be some limirariom that make it challenging to produce measures on all justices. Hall et al. (2021) are
up-fronr about not being able to generate measures for Chief Justice Vinson and Justice
Minron because they did not produce enough concurrences. While being forced co omit a
kw ol the justices is not the end of the world-after all, this happens to most everyone
studying judicial behavior at some point in time (ourselves included)-it is, however, pernliar when Hall et al. later argue against using alternative sources of justices' language because "these alternative sources pose serious availability problems" (353). In reality, however, this is not much of a challenge. In our earlier efforts, we gathered enough alternative
text, to t'sLimate personality traits for all the justices during their timespan, including Vinson and Min ton. And, in preparing this article we were easily able to update our estimates
to include newly appointed justices. Thus, this serious problem appears to be not so serious after all.
We also wish to highlight several important features of the ideal measurement strategy.
First, the personality estimates should be exogenous to the justices' opinions written while
on the Supreme Court. Scholars should want to avoid a circular measurement procedure.
We would not want to use justice behavior to explain justice behavior, which is circular

and inappropriatl'." As the authors of the leading study on the estimation of Supreme
Court j u,tiu , · idl'.il points remind us, "The circularity concern [of using votes-based ideal
poinL~ to explain rnces] is quire important as a purely technical matter. Strictly speaking,
the scorl·, ,h, ,1ild not be used in chis context" (Martin and Quinn 2005, 2). Similarly, Ho
and Quinn \..:010. 847-48) state:

[If I idt·.tl point l'Stimates are derived from the same votes being modeled in the
regrl'ssion. such models are circular. Estimates of ocher effects become uninterpretable from a causal perspective. Votes are used co explain votes ... [a problem
chat] continues co plague empirical studies of judicial voting.
Much like Segal and Cover's (I 989) decision three decades ago co craft an exogenous
indicator of judicial ideology, researchers ought to employ texts chat are exogenous co the
behavior scholars are most likely co wane to use the resulting personality measures co explain. "One cannot demonstrate that attitudes affect votes when attitudes are operationalized from chose same votes" (558). Thus, scholars seeking to estimate the personalities of political actors should cake pains to ensure the texts they employ do not come from
the same behaviors they intend scholars co examine later.
Second, the text inputs should predominantly reflect the sole work of the justices. Of
course, due to the justices' involvement in government and politics, the things they say
and write over their lifetimes are often for particular audiences. This creates the problem
chat some document types are likely to reveal more about personality traits than ocher
types (Hall 2018, 36). This tension can be successfully addressed {a) by collecting texts
that come from justices' prenomination speeches and writings (or even lower coun opinions when ocher document types are in short supply) and (b) by collecting as much textual
data as possible under conditions where the justices are not strictly beholden to the same
organizational, group, or societal interest. 16
To satisfy those two prongs suggests there is considerable virtue in collecting texts from
various sources as a way to accowu for the fuct that personality traits will be more or less
visible under different situations. The key, however, to making this strategy successful is
that there needs to be an appropriate standardization process in place where documents
with more constraints are weighed accordingly. For example, the standardization process
should _be able to account for the fuct chat less personality can be extracted from a lower
court opinion compared to a speech, presumably because there are more constraints on a
lower co,lrt opinion. Our existing approach does so by comparing the personality content
of actual' texts with ones generated completely at random (Black et al. 2020, 38-41).
15. Nore, though, that one may alleviate this problem with sophisticated srrucrural modds that simultaneously estimate justices' personality traits and the dependent variable of interest (Manin and
Quinn 2005).
16. There is also the issue that some justices produced more speeches and writings than others,
though this is not a significant issue for the vast majority of justices.
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Third, the estimation process should be able co add quickly any newly seated justices.
By relying on concurring opinions as the input method, Hall et al. (2021) must wait a sig-

availahlc).'' This provides a viable roadmap for entrepreneurial scholars to build the next
genn.11 io11 , ,f pn,onality estimates (see also Kern et al. 2014; Park et al. 2015).

nificantly long time before adding new personality estimates. This point becomes sharper
when considering how quickly changes happen to the Court's membership; as of this

hlth, a11 ideal csrimate of personality traits also would contain some measure of uncertainn• or ,r.mdard error of the estimate. The judicial equivalent would be moving from Segal-

writing, we have observed three new justices (Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett) caking

Covn sc 01, ·,. whic.:h only contain ideological point estimates, to Martin-Quinn scores, which

the bench in a span of four years. Having co wait a little while for scores seems reasonable, since a justice's first term or two will not give scholars much data with which co

have standard errors. Having standard errors would be valuable not only from a measuremcn1 sr.111d 11 oint hur also from a substantive point of view. It could contribute to a better

work. But Hall et al. provide scant practical guidance about when a justice will have wrinen

undn,r.mdi11g of how much variation there is in personality traits across situations and time.

enough concurrences to fully reveal his or her personality to scholars. An ideal approach is

Finally, but most importantly, any set of measures should be subjected to a thorough

one that is able to produce an estimate shortly after a nominee is announced-an approach
that is consistent with the standard Segal and Cover (1989) adopted.

validation before proceeding. One ought not expect chat future research will be uniformly
succcssli.11 at rapping into all of che Big Five traits. le could be, for example, that agreeable-

Fourth, scholars ought to employ the most recent developments in text-to-trait technol-

ness is particularly difficult co pin down. Because we do not have self-report measures and

ogy and continue to refine their measures as far as technological advances will allow. For

we cannot use reports by others, that means the primacy method of validation is to compare

example, the recent approach designed by IBM-Watson Personality Insight (WPl)-

how well measures predict or correlate with various behaviors with which the traits are

provides advantages for the task of text-driven personality recognition. WPI infers per-

known to correlate. Importantly, reliance on just one or two behavioral indicators drawn

sonality traits from text based on an open-vocabulary approach (rather than a closed-

from a single concept like ideology is not optimal, especially when existing work on the topic

vocabulacy approach) using a word-embedding technique called GloVe (Global Vectors
for Word Representation) to obtain a vector representation of the input texts, which

is far from clear about what relationships one should expect. We have previously illustrated
this point when validating the measure of conscientiousness by examining its relationship to

then feeds into a model that uses an algorithm that was trained on thousands of individuals who provided both text and answers to personality surveys (IBM 2017). This ap-

other indicators beyond ideology (Black et al. 2020). 19 Relying on only a couple of indicators is a risky proposition, as we demonstrate above with our reassessment of ideology.

proach is an improvement for multiple reasons. Perhaps most importantly, text-based
personality measurement with an open-vocabulary approach outperforms a closed ap-

AN APPLICATION AND A TEST

proach (Schwartz et al. 2013). This method lets the underlying data decide which indi-

So fur, we have identified a number of issues with SCIPEs, both in terms of their construc-

vidual words, multiword phrases, and overall topics best predict an individual's personality

tion as well as their resulting empirical validity. We have also sketched out some thoughts

traits. It creates trait estimates with greater accuracy and efficiency than older approaches

about how an alternative approach could address some of these concerns. In this section,

(Arnoux et al. 2017).

we illustrate the pitfalls of applying the SCIPEs to studies of judicial decision making, and

Unfortunately, as is always the case with a reliance on any cutting-edge technology,

to compare them to measures that are better, we apply them to an analysis of the Supreme

todav's hot fad eventually becomes yesterday's old news. For example, Black et al. (2020)

Court's agenda-setting process. We examine whether conscientiousness makes justices

employed WPI, but that program will soon be sunsetted. So while the processes used to

more likely to vote to grant review when there is conflict among the circuit courts. Con-

generate personality estimates by Black et al. are valid (as are the conscientiousness scores

scientiousness is particularly important to the practice of judging.20 As part of this inquiry,

rhrn I dves), they will eventually need to be replaced when scholars seek to examine more
justiccs. 17 Fortunately, research at the intersection of natural language processing, machine learning, and personality psychology is taking place at a highly vigorous rate. In
one recent example, Obschonka et al. (2020) discuss how to estimate personality traits
from an available dataset established by Schwartz et al. (2013) that contains over 70,000

t accb, ,ok users who also completed a personality survey (and made their posts publicly

I 7. · 1·his highlights a trade-off becween the benefit of accessibility co an open-source process with inferior c,rnnates versus a black-box methodology chat produces superior estimates.

18. While one might object co treating text from Facebook posts as similar to speeches and writings,
_it b important to keep in mind that the WPI approach used Twitter text and Personality Recognizer
used the written ramblings of undergraduate srudents. Facebook poso; cover a wide range of contexts
and are shown to be good predictors of all sorts of social and political characteristics.
19. Seen. 6, where we summarize SCIPE's poor perfunnance in this regard.
20. The American Bar Association's (ABA) Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary calls for
Supreme Court justices that "possess exceptional professional qualifications" such as "industry and diligence ... intellectual capacity, judgment, writing and analytical abilities, knowledge of the law" and
other related characteristics (see https://www.americanbar.org/content/dani/aba/uncategorized/GAO
/Backgrounder.authcheckdam.pdf). The ABA's Canons ofJudicial Ethics state that judges must be conscientious (see https://www.americanbar.org/contentldam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibi
lity/pic_migraced/1924_canons.authcheckdam.pdf).
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we compare the results of empirical models that include the Hall et al. (2021) SCIPE
scores versus our own (Black et al. 2020).
For substantive background, there are two kinds oflegal conflict that are relevant at the
Court's agenda-setting stage and also to this analysis: strong conflict and weak conflict.
Strong conflict exists when there is a square conflict between or among lower courts and
the conflict does not appear to be clearing itself up. In other words, if the same legal question
has come up in multiple circuits and those circuits have reached opposing answers, there is
strong legal conflict involving that issue. In such a case, we would expect all justices to be
sensitive to the conflict and vote to resolve it (e.g., Black and Owens 2009).
Weak conflict is another matter. Here, there is tension among lower court decisions,
but the narure of the conflict is qualitatively different from strong conflict. The need to
address it is perhaps not as pressing-at least for most justices. The two circuit court decisions purportedly at loggerheads might not address an identical legal question. This means
a conflict might be characterized as "shallow," or indirect. Or, it could be that the circuit
courts appear to be working out the conflict on their own, by virtue of one answer to a
legal question gaining favor over another and moving the circuits toward uniformity.
Conscientious justices will treat petitions with weak legal conflict more seriously than
do less conscientious justices (Black et al. 2020). Conscientious people take their professional obligations seriously. Conscientious workers "are predisposed to be organized, exacting, disciplined, diligent, dependable, methodical, and purposeful ... [they] thoroughly
and correctly perform work tasks [and] take initiative in solving problems" (Witt et al.
2002, 164). One of the justices' central duties is to ensure uniformity in the law. It is a task
tint the Court-and only the Court-can accomplish. In cases with strong conflict, all
justices will be inclined toward granting review. But it is in cases with weak legal conflict
thar the conscientious justice's heightened level of duty and problem-solving initiative
should stand out. In sum, we expect that high-conscientious justices are more likely than
low-conscientious justices co vote to grant review to cases that present such legal conflict.
l ollowing Black and Owens (2009) and Black et al. (2020), we test this hypothesis
with a random sample of360 paid, non-death-penalty petitions appealed from the federal
courr of appeals that made the Court's discuss list during the 1986-93 terms. 21 From these
360 petitions we recovered a total of 3,024 individual justice votes. The data on the
justice~· votes originate from the digital images of Justice Blackmun's docket sheets, which
wc retrieved from Epstein, Segal, and Spaeth (2007).

2 I . We sample petitions from the Court's discuss list because these are petitions that have a nonzero
probahility' of being granted, since at lease one justice deemed it worthy of some discussion. We examine onlv petitions from federal courts of appeals because current data allows ideologically estimable comparison, , ,nly berween Supreme Court justices and lower federal coun judges. We exclude capital petitions he, ause they were treated difrerenrly than their noncapital counterparts during the time period of
our ,tud,. The Court automatically added capital cases to the discuss list. Once there, Justices Brennan
and Mar,hall always vored to grant the petition, vacate the death penalcy, and remand the case (Woodward and Armsuong 1979; Lazarus 2005).
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/),/'01,li ,,r \ ;,,-iable. The dependent variable, Grant, measures whether each justice
case ;1 , , ,cc 1,, gra111 (I) or deny (0) review to each certiorari petition in the sample.
Cowci,·mio1is11css. We focus on each justice's conscientiousness; larger values correspond 1,, ~1, ncr u ,nscientiousness. We explore the empirical results using the SCIPE scores
from I l.1II c1 .ii. (2021) and our own indicators (Black et al. 2020). Our personality measure.~ arc derived using che text of a justice's published articles, public speeches, and lower
courc opini, ,11s penned prior to his or her confirmation. We translated these texts into personali1v rrait ~cores using WPI while introducing a novel standardization process to account
for diflerenccs in personality content across document type. 22 For chis article, we have updated these measures to incorporate Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. We also
control for justict:s' scores on the four other personality trait dimensions: openness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism.
Legal Conflict. We create four dummy variables co measure the presence and extent of
lower court conflict within the case. We derive these measures from reading the cert pool
memo in each case. 23 Strong Conflict represents instances when the pool memo writer
acknowledges a clear and deep split among the lower courts. Weak Conflict is present when
the law clerk, while assessing the presence of alleged conflict, suggests that immediate review may not be necessary. Alleged Conflict occurs if the petitioner in the case alleges a
conflict among lower courts but the pool memo writer denies the existence of this conflict.
No Conflict is the baseline category in our models, and it represents instances where the
petitioner did not allege any legal conflict among the lower courts.
With these four binary variables in hand, we then interact them with conscientiousness. We also control for multiple factors that previous research has shown to influence
the policy and legal motivations behind Supreme Court agenda setting (see, e.g., Black
and Owens 2009). (See the appendix for full coding details.)

22. We describe this process in extensive detail in Black et al. (2020, 38-41), but here's the succinct
version: we first created randomly generated documents from each type of document from which we
could compare the raw personalicy estimates. We then used these random documents to generate
document-level trait scores and calculated the document-type mean and standard deviation for each of
the Big Five traits. This provided a baseline estimate of how much personality is present when the documents were "written" randomly by "someone" with absolutely no meaningful personalicy (i.e., our computer; sorry, computer). We then used these values to standardize the raw scores for our actual corpus
:>f preconfirmation texts. The resulting standardized scores identify observed personality above and beyond documents of the same type generated in the absence of meaningful personality.
23. It should be noted that this approach is similar to the one utilized by Caldeira and Wright
( 1988), who used law students to assess the presence of actual conflict in cert petitions. Our approach,
however, has rwo added advantages. First, the cert pool memos are the actual materials used by the
justices in the cert pool. And Black and Owens (2009) conducted an intercoder reliability study, indicating that all measures were reliable using common metrics. Second, our approach avoids confirmation
bias. Caldeira and Wright ( 1988) had law students assess conflict afi:er the Court had decided co grant
(or deny) review 10 a petition.
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I ir:mc· 1 ,,, shows. :ts expected, clrnc che impacr of Strong Conflict is always sracistica.lly

METHODS AND RESULTS

We employ logistic regression models with robust standard errors, estimating tv,o models
each for our versus the SCIPE indicators: ( l ) a baseline t rait~-only model that specifies the

.~ignil1,·.1111 .111d pmitivc, and its m:'.lgnirude increases ever so slightly across the range of our
con,, i, 111 1, , 1s110 , 111c.1sure. Thar is, wh1:n confronred by a petitio n char conveys a strong

interaction terms between conscientiousness and each legal conRicr variable, along with
the four other personality traits; and (2) a full model specification chat includes all concrol
predictors. (The appendix reports the table of regression resulrs.) Figure 6 reports the average marginal effects (with 95% confidence intervals) of strong and weak legal conflict
(compared to the baseline of no conflict) across the range of conscientiousness.

dcgrn · ufl"w..:r coLm conf➔ icr (comparc:d to o ne with no conflict), all justices :u e generally
mud , 111,11 , lih:h 10 seek co grant cert. Increasingly consciencious juscices are on ly some-

First consider the analysis using our own personality indicators. Both models support
our theoretical expectations. The impact oflegal conflict varies significantly based on conscientiousness, and in a way that is most evident among petitions with weak legal conflict.
That is, weak legal conflict exhibits its greatest impact on the most conscientious justices in
the sample and no meaningful impact on the Ieasr conscientious justices.

wha1 "" " '- ,kcl~· w do so ch.in less conscienrious justices.
Fig1irc (,/, is.perhaps, rhc most important figu re for our applicatio n. Ir highlight~ how
jusri, ,·, 11,·.11 1•eri1i,,11s with weak legal conAicr. As the figure makes clear, weak conRicc fa ils
co mu v,· ju, 1ic1.:s wich lower conscientious ness (using o ur conscientious ness inclicaror). In
ocher word,. rhc 11.:asc conscientious justices do nor meaningfi.tlly distinguish berween
weak conHicc :rncl no confiicr. However, as a justice's conscientiousness increases, he or
she bc.:n111c~ sign ificanrly more likdy to grant review when confronted by weak conflict.
lndccd, when conscientiousness is ac che 90th percentile, a jusrice is 0.1 4 more likely co
vore co grant review co a pe;:tirion with weak conAicr (0.27) as compared to o ne whe re no
conRicr (0.1 4) exists-roughly twice t he likelihood of review. T his provides considerable
support, in a cl1eorecically sensible manner, for the role of conscientiousness in addressing

a

conAict ac cl1e agenda scage (at least if using our personality indicators).
Our r<::s ulcs diverge significantly from t hose we retrieve when us ing t he SClPEs
and Hall's (2018) o ri ginal analysis, however. Hall hypothesizes rhar "more-conscientious
jusciccs arc less likely ro c.1sr a g ram vote because pursuing policy objectives violates their
judicial ducy'' (55). His results purport to show this. But there are two major problems
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with this claim. 1: irsc, che hypothesis assumes char granting review somehow automatically triggers the pursuit of policy objectives in violation of the judicial duty. It does no th-
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l
~o

ing of t he sort. It simply puts rhe case o n the Court's docket (assuming three others a lso
vote ro gra nt) for rhc Court ro decide. \--V-hac happens next is within t he control of the
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justices. Ar chis point, jusrices can pursue legal or policy objectives (or bod1 simultaneously) .
Second, rhe logical implication of chis sracemenc is that conscientious justices-those
who are strongly motivated by clury and obligation-would not grant review to any cases.
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The idea that the justices who are most responsible, most dutiful, and most rule-abiding
would simply decline to hear :111y cases is no r sensible. Perhaps most obvio usly, ic is well
established char one of the pri mary d uties of the Supreme Cow, is co reduce lower court
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conflict. Suggesting a conscientious justice would not grant cert because it violates cheir
judicial duty creares a major internal conAicr for the justice because it would mean they
could not fulfill one of cl1e most important duties of the Supreme Court: unifying rhe law
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Figure 6. The conditional impact of lower court legal conflict and conscientiousness on
Supr0rni:: ' 0urt justices' votes to grant certiorari. Average margina l effects of Strong Conflict (a) and Wea k Conflict (b), with 95% confidence intervals, across the range of Conscientiousness usi ng our updated personality indicators (i.e., results from model 2). Panels c
and d, Sar' ave rage marginal effects but using the Hall et al. (2013) SCIPE scores
(i.e., results from model 4).

for the lower courcs.
Figure 6c shows the average marginal effect ofScwng Conflict (wicl1 95% confidence
inrer\'als), compared co rhe baseline of no conRict, across the range of conscientiousness
using the SCI PE indicators. The figu re shows that the impact of Strong Conflict is stariscically significant and positive, but ics m agnitude decreases across the range of conscientiousness. That is, when confronted w ith a petition that conveys a strong degree of lower
court conAict (compared co o ne with no conAict), all justices are generally likely seek to
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grant certiorari, but the SCIPE measures suggest that more conscientious justices may be
somewhat less likely to do so.
Figure 6d shows the opposite interactive effect from figure 6b. In figure 6d, the SCI PE
measures suggest that weak conflict shapes the impact of conscientiousness in a counterintuitive manner. That is, weak conflict matters less when viewed by a more conscientious
justice, and such conflict ultimately exhibits no impact at all among the most conscientious
justices. By contrast, when SCI PE conscientiousness is low (at the 10th percentile), a justice
is 0.19 more likely to vote to grant review to a petition with weak conflict (0.424) as compared to one where no conflict (0.237) exists. Taken together, the results using the SCIPEs
are incompatible with the premise that duty compels the conscientious justice to seek to
fulfill the Supreme Court's foremost agenda-setting task: to resolve lower court conflict.
DISCUSSION
Recently, Epstein and Knight (2013, 13) sounded an alarm for judicial politics scholars,

arguing: "Only by updating our theories and empirics to develop a more complete vision
ofjudging will we continue to remain players in a field that is now more vibrant than ever."
We could not agree more. As fur as we are concerned, approaches that fail to treat judges
and justices as "regular" individuals-including their personalities-are oflimited use to
fully understanding judicial behavior. But, for these types of studies to thrive, scholars
must continue to be attentive to their measurements. As we have demonstrated here, however, the Hall et al. (2021) SCIPE measures that form the foundation for Hall (2018) are
severely limited.
But what should one do instead so as to stay "in the game," as Epstein and Knight ask
us to do? On the basis of the evidence presently available, we believe our existing approach,
presented in Black et al. (2020), provides a valid indicator of the conscientiousness trait.
These measures exist for 41 justices, including the three most recent appointees: Gorsuch,
Kavanaugh, and Barrett. As to the other Big Five traits, we are frankly less convinced that
any measure is ready yet for prime time-ours included. To establish that, one would need

to gather a variety of validation indicators specifically tailored for the trait of interest.
Combining different disciplines often produces influential and informative new theories that alter the direction of those respective disciplines. That promises to be the case with
the union of personality scholarship and judicial politics. We must be careful, however, to
employ measures equal to the task. The SCIPE measures have critical flaws that limit their
usefulness. But appropriate measures, following useful parameters, can and will move the
disciplin( forward.
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